



This is the published version 
 
 
McCredden, Lyn 2008, Sacred violence in the Chamberlain case, Antipodes, 

















Copyright: 2008, American Association of Australian Literary Studies 
 
 
IIU" ~~ I~ "'200903117




In 2004, Di Drew, director of the two-part miniseries Through
My Eyes, based on the Chamberlain case, reported that when
she spoke about Lindy Chamberlain to groups of friends, or
In the early 1980s, many Australians demanded their say
about "Lindy Chamberlain." On radio, in letters to the
media, over coffee and on television, we exposed our wisdoms
about mothering, matricide, inappropriate family holiday
destinations, religious sects, the dressing of children in
black, the desert, the law, and the requirements of justice.
Australians-not for the first time-eagerly devoured tales of
uncanny happenings in the desert. In the heart of the county,
at Ayers Rock as it was still called, a sacrifice of some kind
had occurred. "Why would you take a child out there?" "As if
a dingo could do that!"
At the center of the maelstrom was the small, determined
figure of a woman. The factors that signaled out Lindy
Chamberlain from the very beginning were her gender and her
religion. Her gender, or the way she was perceived to perform
it, was seen increasingly as truculent, not sufficiently grief-
stricken, not meek or repentant in the face of growing media
and legal accusations against her. Further, the Chamberlains'
membership of what mainstream Australia saw as a "strange,"
imported religious group, The Seventh Day Adventists, soon
became a source of intrigue and some derision to the general
public. Not seen as a cult, quite, this barely understood
American religious group and the Chamberlains' membership
of it was deemed different and suspicious.
Within this context of increasingly flamboyant media
constructions-a gothic, violent outback setting that even
today lives within myths of frontier lawlessness, paganism,
and racial atrocities-the figure of Lindy Chamberlain rose
up as scapegoat. Woman as good or evil Mother, as strong
or hardened, as one of "us" or a stranger in our midst - no
image of Lindy Chamberlain was produced which could not
be twisted into the shape of its opposite. In the gathering
clouds of "hearsay" and "judgment," Australian society was,
perhaps half-knowingly, enacting a sacred and ancient ritual,
offering up one for the whole.
* * *
to the extras on set, asking whether they thought Lindy (as
many called her) guilty or innocent, "the response was usually
the same: the group divides 65/35 per cent, with the majority
verdict being guilty." For Drew this was amazing, and she
reflects on the ways in which myth accrues around history
and everyday normality: "It was all about that landscape
and that place. It was about spirituality and it's been about
religion, and a baby's name, and behaviour that's not typical"
(Enker 4).
However, for John Bryson, author of the book-length study
Evil Angels, also later made into a film, such behaviors were
not atypical; nor were the many so-called scientific biases and
mistakes made across the years since that night, 17 August
1980. They are for him the product of culture. In a sharply
positioned piece in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1995, after
the belated inquest into the whereabouts of the body of Azaria
Chamberlain, Bryson wrote:
Once the laboratory mistakes are all swept away, the
witnesses left standing have human faces ... this third
finding is a product of its culture, as are judgments of any
kind. In that culture, we watch a fascinating mechanism
at work: it's something like an inability to retrace one's
steps, whatever the cost, or however wrong the path was
(Bryson 21).
This essay explores the nature of this "fascinating mechanism,"
asking how culturally typical was the behavior of those
intimately involved in the Chamberlain case, and of those
more far-flung but still somehow drawn into the drama. The
case reminds us of the potency of myth, and of ritual, the uses
to which they are put in supposedly secular, political contexts.
Myths-and stereotypes-about women in many cultures-
damned whores and god's police, Mary the mother of God and
Mary Magdalene, in myth a prostitute; women as dirty, and
women as pure, or at least sent to clean. Further, the essay will
argue that responses to the Chamberlain case, and particularly
to the figure of Lindy Chamberlain, need to be read within a
context of sacredness, ritual, and scapegoating, concepts with
disturbing connotations for many in the supposedly deeply
secular nation of Australia. The Lindy Chamberlain case
opens up the intimate link that exists between the sacred and
violence-as the world crashes down, woman will descend
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and sweep up the shards; or, differently, it has all gone
wrong, it must be her f'lUlt. Not only is the Chamberlain case
readable within such a context, but much of the import of
wh,'lt happened to this woman and her family needs to be
examined in relation to the category of the sacred, as a way of
thinking further through the often rancorous divide between
sacred and secular in Australian culture.
SACRED AND PROFANE
While secularity has its own history, and cannot be reduced
to "the profane," it's important firstly to examine the division
between the realms of the sacred and the profane that structure
early twentieth-century anthropological thinking. In Emile
Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912),
Rudolf Otto's The Idea of the Holy (1933), and Mircea Eliade's
The Sacred and the Profane (1957), the realm ofthe sacred was
articulated as separate from the profane world of everyday,
domestic, and ordinary existence, though impinging upon it
as an archaic force. In Durkheim's work this power was life
giving and necessary to individuals and society but could also
be ambiguous and even dangerous. Otto built on Durkheim's
notion of the anti-rational power of the sacred, locating it
"beyond" the profane and employing certain elements of the
sublime, including dread and awe in response to the sacred. For
Durkheim, the sacred operated in society through the setting
aside of specific times, places, actions (rituals of sacrifice and
blood-letting, cleansing, purifying, etc.) and objects (totems,
emblems), which maintained for the clan a separation of
sacred and profane.
For Mary Douglas, too, writing several decades later,
ritual was at the core of understanding the relations
between sacred and profane. In Douglas's canonical work
Purity and Danger (1966), based on her field work in the
Belgian Congo {1949-1951 and 1953), she is concerned
with understanding the rules a culture establishes in order
to decide what is clean and what unclean, what is to be
considered holy and what untouchable. In relation to the
foundations of ongoing]ewish cultural rules regarding what
can and cannot be eaten, and what is constituted as clean,
Douglas wrote: "A rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms
and strengthens the definitions to which they do not conform"
(41). Douglas' work continued this concern with borders and
definitions, asking how and why it is that peoples need to
classify, and to ritualize those classifications. Developing her
understandings of taboos and cleanliness in overtly religious
societies, she extended these cultures' need for classification
and ritual, applying her findings to all societies, writing:
As a social animal, man is a ritual animal. If ritual is
suppressed in one form, it crops up in others, more strongly
the more intense the social interaction ... Social rituals
create a reality which would be nothing without them. It
is not too much to say that ritual is more to society than
words are to thought. (63)
Hence, Douglas's work elaborated upon the sacred aspects of
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ritual, taboo, anomaly, and conformity to the group, across
both religious and so-called secular societies, understanding
that cultures need to establish what is acceptable and necessary
for order, as against what must be eradicated as anomalous.
Ritual, and the raw, instinctual nature of the processes that
impel such rituals of recrimination and bloodletting, were
certainly evident in the Chamberlain case.
Like Douglas, philosopher Rene Girard has been
influential in questioning this earlier dichotomy of sacred
and profane. His seminal texts Violence and the Sacred and
The Scal)egoat contribute in specific ways to understanding
the Chamberlain case. What are most pertinent are Girard's
insights into the relationships between sacredness, violence,
and sacrifice, read, with Douglas, as pertaining not just to
other, past or so-called primitive societies, but in the urban,
western cultures of today.
For Girard, social violence must be understood as a central,
sacred, and structuring element of social life. Girard argues:
the operations of violence and the sacred are ultimately
the same process. Although ethnologists are generally
disposed to acknowledge that violence exists at the heart of
the sacred, they also hasten to add that the sacred includes
another, more important and directly contradictory
element ... it involves order as well as disorder, peace as
well as war, creation as well as destruction ... the theory
of generative violence permits us to define the sacred in
simple, concrete terms Nonviolence appears as the
gratuitous gift of violence men are only capable of
reconciling their differences at the expense of a third
party ... the surrogate victim. (Violence 273)
In conjoining the violent and sacred practices ofmany cultures
through history, Girard also (controversially) introduces
the pan-historical role of the scapegoat and of communal
sacrifice. He asks how communities, when they are undergoing
particular forms ofviolence-whether from nature, or between
warring groups, or because of an individual's actions-found
stability and equilibrium again. Girard describes what he calls
"generative unanimity," understood as "a process for changing
bad violence into stability and fecundity ... in the attenuated
form of ritual sacrifice." (280-81). It is in 'this reading of the
workings of the sacred that the role of a surrogate victim
arises.
Of course, Girard's interpretive agendas need to be
acknowledged from the outset. He makes his claims regarding
the role of the scapegoat and of ritual within a larger-and
in many aspects quite radical-Christian context, which
acknowledges the centrality of Christ who "offered us a new
historical possibility for breaking the underlying structure
of violence" (Petersen 642). As his critics have argued,
it is sometimes unclear whether Girard's claims are really
historical and scientific, and how much they are metaphorical
or psychological. As one critic of Girard et ai's Things Hidden
since the Foundation of the World (1987) writes:
when he seeks to ground his psychological insights within
a literal historical framework, he becomes insensitive to
the complexities of the religious symbolization process. By
insisting that there literally must be a "founding murder"
as origin ofsacrificial ritual, he artificially separates human
symbolizing from historical phenomena." (Petersen 642)
ORDINARY AUSTRALIA
My argument rests strongly on the psychological and
metaphoric resonances of Girard's ideas. It is irrefutable
that such processes of scapegoating, with all their tragic
dimensions, were set in train around the Chamberlain
case. The complicating factor-of bad violence turned into
stability-described by Girard in positive, Christian terms in
regard to a society's need for ritual, can be seen operating, but
askew, in this case. Australians-supposedly laconic, secular,
not given to the genre of high tragedy, but more usually of
comedy or self-parody-found themselves embroiled in a
narrative that horrified and fascinated: sacrifice, a child's
death, maternal guilt, an ancient desert setting which
provoked wild characterizations and judgments. A grand
moral and existential battle was initiated juridically and in
the media on the back of an "ordinary" Australian family. I
In the name of justice, Australians from many different
places and backgrounds wanted their say, and their say, it
seemed, demanded a culprit, legal intervention, a scapegoat,
and retribution. It was almost as if it was every Australian's
right and duty to have something to say, and this something
was usually of a moral, and/or judicial nature. The dingo and
black sacrifice jokes came a little later. This phenomenon
of nationwide opinionizing highlights the core cultural
contradiction: in the name of communal justice and stability,
an avalanche of violent and scapegoating media articles,
television programmes, and legal processes were unleashed on
the head of a woman. How far can we interpret this avalanche
of attention and involvem~nt in the case, from right around
the country, as well as internationally, as an enactment of
ancient, sacred ritual of scapegoating, as evidence of a deep
need to keep the borders of social stability patrolled, the
role of the woman and the family in place, the sanctity of
motherhood fixed?
Lindy Chamberlain was fixed: as a Seventh Day Adventist,
the wife of a preacher, from the highly religious community
of Cooranbong, near Avondale, NSW, where there was a
Seventh Day Adventist theological college and five SDA
churches, one with over 1000 members, in a small area. Not
much was known by the broader Australian society about
Seventh Day Adventists then, but it was soon broadcast
that they were vegetarians, that they didn't drink coffee, tea,
or alcohol, and that they officially adhered to strict laws of
justice and personal righteousness. For Adventists, Jesus was
believed to have removed himself from Earth at his death, and
to be doing "investigative judgment" on all who would make
a claim to be admitted to heaven. Americans Ellen G. White
and her husband James were discussed in public forums as
prophets of the SDA movement: they had lived in Australia,
in the Avondale area, and had chosen under God's directions
the site of the theological college.2 Such background "facts"
began to circulate about Lindy Chamberlain and her family's
religious history. Secular Australia was in a frenzy.
Within this national frenzy a litany of strange "facts"
and moral opinions, still able to be recited today by many
Australians, began to circulate via the media and from person
to person: the child had been named "Azaria," which meant
"sacrifice in the desert"; Lindy had been known to dress the
baby in black, with connotations of Satanism or witchery
for some pundits; the deed had been committed in a strange,
even haunted place, Ayers Rock (Uluru), where Aborigines
were making what to non-indigenous Australians sounded
like wild claims about sacred connections to the country, and
the Rock. What kind of woman would take her children out
to such a place-and such a young child at that? The buzz of
suspicion soon grew deafening across the country, and Lindy
Chamberlain was transformed, little by little, from suffering
mother to perpetrator.
THE FEMALE MONSTER AND HER SOCIETY
In the public embrace of these religious "facts" and opinions,
Chamberlain was transmogrified even further from woman to
some other kind of creature: doing her nails in court, refusing
to cry in public, affectless. The discourses that began to
emerge around her raised questions about whether she was
a real mother, a real woman, a normal Australian. In this
context we must ask again: "What is a scapegoat?" Girard
describes the nature of the ritual victim:
If the victim is to polarize the aggressive tendencies
of the community and effect their transfer to himself
(sic), continuity must be maintained. There must be
a "metonymic" relationship between members of the
community and ritual victims. There must also be
discontinuity. The victim must be neither too familiar to
the community nor too foreign to it ... this ambiguity is
essential to the cathartic function of the sacrifice. (286)
While critics such as Martha Reineke have criticized Girard
for the lack of gender concerns in his universalizing and pan-
historical anthropology (Reineke 1992), Girard's analysis
of the processes of the sacred and of societal demands for
sacrificial victims is still, arguably, enormously helpful and
suggestive as we observe the Chamberlain case. Do we, in
this case, detect "a collective transference against a collective
victim that can be completely arbitrary and against whom
all tensions are projected, the scapegoat." (Girard, qtd. in
Muller). Some would argue that the legal and communal
processes that "established" Lindy Chamberlain as guilty
were not completely arbitrary, yet in hindsight they take
on an awful, arbitrary logic: the woman as scapegoat. Julia
Kristeva's gendered intervention on the nature of the sacred
does move us one step further in thinking about the context
of the Chamberlain case:
Could the sacred be, whatever its variants, a two-sided
formation? One aspect founded by murder, and the social
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bond made up of murder's guilt-ridden atonement, with
all the projective mechanisms and obsessive rituals that
accompany it; and another aspect, like a lining, more
secret still and invisible, non-representable, oriented
toward those uncertain spaces of unstable identity,
toward the fragility-both threatening and fusional-of
the archaic dyad, toward the non-separation of subject/
object, on which language has no hold but one woven of
fright and repulsion? (Kristeva 58)
In Powers of Horror, Kristeva introduces gender and the
archaic dyad-the mother and child-into her discussion of
sacredness and scapegoating. She also suggests an even more
primal origin to this figure of woman-woman as the one who
will always already be both source ofidentity and meaning, and
of defilement, abjection, loss of stability. Kristeva, drawing on
Freudian and Nietszchean notions of archaic violence, here
distinguishes between the socio-political realities of violence
and its ritual assuaging, on the one hand, and a more linguistic
and psychological understanding of the primal human
condition, formed through the dyad of mother and child, and
before language, representability, identity. This latter stC!te
she describes as causing "fright and repulsion" in the proper,
law-abiding world of discrete representations, of right and
wrong, he and she, murderer and innocent. By extension, the
scapegoat in Kristeva's frame must be the abject creature par
excellence, passing from the proper to the improper, the clean
to the monstrous, the mother to the murderer. That which
both fascinates and must be expelled.
And so the question must be asked again of the very
real-everyday, political, lived-Chamberlain case:
Is transformation-of social violence, of the rituals of
bloodletting, scapegoating, and abjecting at a social level-
ever possible? Can the memory of the Chamberlain case effect
a difference in the way Australians conduct their processes
of mercy and justice? In the face of Kristeva's psychoanalytic
universalizing, it perhaps seems a na'ive question. Are
societies-pre-modern and so-called modern-inevitably
driven to such rituals of perpetual scapegoating?
PERPETUAL SCAPEGOATING?
According to Girard, and also the anthropologist and Biblical
scholar Mary Douglas, so-called modern societies with their
sophisticated legal procedures are in no way exempt from the
sacred demand for release from guilt. Girardian critic Stephen
Kaufman takes up this question:
What about "civilized" cultures? They are not free of
sacred violence, but it tends to be more hidden, for at
least two reasons. First, courts of law have generated
order in "civilized" societies such that there appears to
be no need for scapegoating to maintain social order.
If someone feels slighted, they may take the issue to a
supposedly impartial court, and peaceful resolution is
possible in ways that are often not available to primal
cultures. The need for sacred violence therefore appears
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reduced. In truth, judges have become the high priests,
rendering judgment and punishing wrongdoers. A
Girardian analysis still points to sacred violence at the
origin of differentiating "good" from "bad," from which
the law derives. (online)
This paper has been arguing that it is important to recognize
Lindy Chamberlain, and to a lesser extent her family, as
scapegoats of Australian culture's sacred violence. Often
Girard, especially in his earlier works, speaks and writes as if
such mechanisms are inevitably and simply repetitious, and
that all societies are prone to this "storage of violent energy
which tends towards explosion and ... In order for this violence
to be deferred there must be a collective transference against a
collective victim that can be completely arbitrary and against
whom all tensions are projected, the scapegoat." (Girard, qtd.
in Muller). If we accept Girard's basic premises (as historical,
and/or metaphorical), we are able to consider "modern"
societies, just as much as overtly religious cultures, now and
in the past, as gripped and impelled by such mechanisms. It
would take another essay, at least, to open up Girard's and
others' arguments regarding the possibility of transformation
of such mechanisms in the modern era.
At a more popular level of discourse, but similarly
attempting to think about what purpose Lindy Chamberlain's
scapegoating served for Australian society, the anonymous
Australian author of the onemansweb blog site wrote on the
topic:
Lindy Chamberlain offered us a wonderful opportunity.
We could vent all our rage about children, and all our
guilt, on this woman who was telling such an "unlikely"
story. She was the ideal candidate for a scapegoat: female,
not showing enough grief, a member of a strange religious
group. We could safely tip all our hatred, prejudice and
anger on her-as journalist, police, or the ever-expert
general public.
While oneman has a gender-inflected argument here, it's
important to note that his fuller discussion also embraces
the Australian treatment of "disgraced" Governor-General
Hollingsworth and what oneman calls "the howls for his
resignation," and the "baying on commercial radio talkback."
Scapegoating in the case of Lindy Chamberlain does of course
have a very different orientation and set of circumstances.
However, the same operations of social violence were
observable in the case of former Bishop Hollingsworth, who
before he was submitted to any civic legal inspection was
caught up in highly emotional and explosive declarations of
his guilt. As a religious figure accused of being at the very least
"passive" in regard to the Anglican church's abuse of children,
he was constantly described as culpable by the broader
populace. In common with many societies, Australians have
a history of vociferously calling for blood when the inflaming
issue of the safety of children, in relation to the institutions
of religion, is seen to be at stake, as they were in both the
Chamberlain and the Hollingsworth cases.
LOGOS OF VIOLENCE, LOGOS OF LOVE
It has been possible to show that the Lindy Chamberlain
case affirms, or even exemplifies, the central and arguably
pessimistic thesis of perpetual scapegoating. Such arguments
suggest that the practice continues in contemporary Australian
society. However, in the context of the subsequent actions of
individuals of good will, in parts of the Australian legal system
and more generally, of those who were able to interpret acts of
scapegoating in the Chamberlain case and to deconstruct its
mechanisms in multiple ways, can Australians, in John Bryson's
words, acknowledge the cost and the wrong path taken? Can we
hope that this critical reflexivity and self-knowledge might act
as a counterbalance to the worst effects of scapegoating? In his
later view of sacred violent repetition, Girard does offer some
more hopeful arguments. His 1987 work Things Hidden since the
Foundation of the World points to this capacity for societies to
understand their own violent sources. For Girard, such cultural
self-knowledge comes slowly, however, through revelation:
The Logos of love puts up no resistance; it always allows
itself to be expelled by the Logos of violence. But its
expulsion is revealed in a more and more obvious fashion,
and by the same process the Logos of violence is revealed
as what can only exist by expelling the true Logos and
feeding upon it in one way or another. (Girard 274)
Articulated in broad theological terms, Girard's argument
might be too close to Christian dogma. At the everyday level
of individuals and cultures, this understanding of the struggle
between "the Logos of love" and the "Logos of violence"
might make little sense, might seem merely metaphoric, or
mystical. Certainly the living woman, Lindy Chamberlain,
did not go peacefully or without a murmur-under the sign
of love-into prison. She and her supporters waged vigorous
resistance legally and through the media, against the violence
to which she saw herself and her family being subjected. This
resistance necessarily took place in a cultural context in which
violent and subterranean, as well as overt religious and sexual
stereotyping, was rife, and on terms already decreed by the
"modern" society of which she was a citizen: the institutions
of its policing, law, mass media, scientific knowledge. Such
institutions, still trailing their enlightenment beliefs, most
often define themselves as operating impartially-believing
themselves to be at some remove from the perceived extremes
both of "the Logos of love" and the "Logos of violence."
Twenty-eight years later we can now reflect on what we have
learned from "the Chamberlain case": from the life, expressed
feelings, beliefs, actions, and experiences ofLindy Chamberlain
the woman, her daughter Azaria, her husband Michael, and
their three other children, who were turned violently by their
society into scapegoats. There will be individual responses to
this drama, but at the level of the culture Girard's theory rings
true here. Has the nature of the drama played out between "The
Logos of love" and "The Logos of violence" become clearer in
the intervening years? Can the Chamberlain case stand as a
memorial, an accrual of wisdom, so that the very institutions of
this culture might be changed and empowered to acknowledge
the horror and farce of violence and scapegoating to which it is
so ineluctably and repeatedly drawn?
The final, though belated, liberation and legal vindication
of Lindy Chamberlain may make us feel something of that new
possibility. However, in the larger context of Australia's actions
towards its indigenous peoples, and towards the many refugees
who have sought asylum in this modern nation, it seems that
scapegoating-the militant protecting of the borders of the self
and the community against perceived violences without and
within---<::ontinues, driven so often by potent, archaic forces.
The recent Apology to the members of the indigenous stolen
generation, delivered on behalf of the Federal government
by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, might be read in this larger
context of sacred violence, as a new, more hopeful public ritual
that seeks to address the repetitions of the past. 0
NOTES
1 Of course, Freud was following the ancients, he argued, when he
delineated the complexes and taboos that brew within the heart
of the family, and all those fatal mothers and daughters: Medea,
Antigone, Clytemnestra, Electra.
2 Ellen Gould White (1827-1915), acclaimed as an SDA prophetess,
visited Australia from America between 1891 and 1900. See The
Australian Dictionary of Biography entry.
WORKS CITED
Bryson, John. "The search for a culprit continues." Sydney
Morning Herald 16/12/1995. "News and Features," 21.
Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Farms of Religious Life. 1912.
Trans. Joseph Swain. London: Allen and Unwin, 1963.
Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane: the nature of
Religion. Trans. Willard R. Trask, New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1957.
Enker, Debi. "Trial by Fury." Sydney Morning Herald 22/1/2004:
"The Guide," 4.
Girard, Rene. The Scapegoat. 1982. Trans.Yvonne Freccero.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.
---. Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1987.
---. Violence and the Sacred. 1977. London and New York:
Continuum, 2005.
Kaufman, Stephen R. "Christianity and the Problem of
Human Violence." Accessed May, 2005. <http://www.
all-creatures.org/living/cphv-030.html>
Kristeva, Julia. In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and
Faith. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Columbia
UP, 1987.
---. Powers of Horror. New York: Columbia UP, 1982.
McKenna, Andrew J. Violence and Difference: Girard, Derrida,
and Deconstruction. Chicago: U of lllinois P, 1992.
Muller, Markus. "Interview with Rene Girard." Anthropoetics





Otto, Rudolf. The idea of the holy : an inquiry into the non-
rational factor in the iidea of the divine and its relation to the
rational. 1933. Tnll1s. John W. Harvey. New York: Oxford
UP, 1950.
Peterson, Thomas V. "Rev. ofThings Hidden Since the Foundation
of the World by Rene Girard." Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 57.3 (Autumn 1989): 63-64.
Reineke, Martha J. "The Mother in Mimesis: Kristeva and
Girard on Violence and the Sacred." In Body/Text in Julia
Kristeva: Religion, Women, and Psychoanalysis. Ed. David R.
Crownfield. Albany, State U of New York P, 1992: 67-85.
B. N. Oakman
LYN McCREDDEN teaches Australian and post-colonialliteratllre
at Deakin University, Melboume. She is the author of James
McAuley (1992), Bridgings: Readings in Australian Women's
Poetry (1996), and co-editor of Feminism and the Sacred: Creative
Suspicions (2002). With Bill Ashcroft and Frances Devlin-Glass
she is the author of Intimate Horizons: the Sacred in Australian
Literature (forthcoming, ATF Press, 2009).
In Defense of Hawaiian Shirts
Too many uniforms mean a country's tllming dangerous,
that's what I thought as I watched Triumph of the Will*-
masses of Germans marching (in step)
kitted out in matching threads and shod with leather boots (named Jack)
and the film's star is The Fuhrer (he of curt salutes and silly poses)
who shouts a lot about the rules for partying with his tidy mob.
And today it frightens me nobody simply works a job,
they are members of a team and trussed
in corporate garb for fish shops, planes and pubs and banks
and embroidered with their masters' names-even those
who drive a taxi are buttoned in a company shirt
(with insignia, epaulets and badge)
and everyone of them commands that I enjoy my bloody day.
So it's with some fondness I remember
(and I don't believe I've made this up)
being served one cold July (in Customs) by a silent splendid clerk
who wore a loud Hawaiian shirt
where the waves were blue and the sands were gold
and lithe brown girls in grassy skirts
with hibiscus flowers in their raven hair
swayed beneath his printed palms and shimmered with Alohas.
*Triumph des Willens, 1934, dir. Leni Riefenstahl, 114m, b&w
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